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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The initiative currently designated as 1487 is a measure that would change California law by 
disallowing the use of automatic payroll-deducted funds for political purposes by unions, 
corporations, and government contractors.1  Measure 1487 is qualified for the November 2012 
ballot.  If passed, this measure would make California political contribution laws stricter than 
federal law in the area of payroll deductions.2  As California law stands right now, unions and 
corporations are free to automatically deduct money from employees’ paychecks and use those 
funds for political contributions.  Federal law allows for this same use of paycheck deductions 
for political purposes.3
 
 
This initiative would also prohibit unions and corporations from making direct or indirect 
contributions to candidates and candidate-controlled committees, while political expenditures 
derived from resources other than automatic payroll deductions would remain unrestricted.4  
Corporate profits being used towards direct or indirect political contributions, for example, 
would remain unrestricted.5  Under Measure 1487, government contractors would be able to 
make contributions to elected officers or officer-controlled committees, but only if the elected 
official who benefited from that contribution did not attempt to use his or her official position to 
influence the granting or awarding of a government contract.6  However, this guard against 
corruption in regards to beneficiaries of government contracts is already a part of state law.7  
Currently, California law prohibits agents and independent contractors from contributing more 
than $500 on behalf of or for the benefit of any candidate or committee unless the candidate or 
committee reports the expenditure as if they had made it themselves.8  This prohibition includes, 
but is not limited to, contributions made to an advertising agency.9
 
  
A “yes” vote on Measure 1487 would make the restriction on the use of payroll-deducted funds 
for political purposes apply to unions, corporations and government contractors alike.10  
Employees would still be permitted to make voluntary contributions to their employer or 
employer’s committees if written authorization was given every year.11
                                                 
1 Proposed Statewide Ballot Measure from Ashlee Titus, Proponent, to Krystal Paris, Initiative Coordinator, Office 
of the Attorney General, California (April 1, 2011) (on file with McGeorge California Initiative Review). 
  The change to existing 
law would provide that if the union employees did not consent annually to these deductions, the 
deductions could not be taken automatically.  Corporations and government contractors would be 
2 11 C.F.R. § 114.2 (2012).  
3 11 C.F.R. § 114.5 (2012). 
4 11 C.F.R. § 114.2 (2012). 
5 Id. 
6 Proposed Statewide Ballot Measure from Ashlee Titus to Krystal M. Paris, supra note 1. 
7 Great West Contractors Inc. v. Irvine Unified School District, 187 Cal.App.4th 1425 (2010), citing Schram 
Construction, Inc. v. Regents of the University of California, 187 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1053-1054 (2010), and 
Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera, 181 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1224 (2010) (considering bidding statutes 
“in light of the purpose for which they were enacted,” namely ‘to guard against favoritism, improvidence, 
extravagance, fraud and corruption, and to secure the best work or supplies at the lowest price practicable’”). 
8 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84303 (West 2001).  
9 Id. 
10 Proposed Statewide Ballot Measure from Ashlee Titus to Krystal M. Paris, supra note 1. 
11 Proposed Statewide Ballot Measure from Ashlee Titus to Krystal M. Paris, supra note 1. 
subject to the same limitation, although these types of organizations do not tend to collect money 
from employees through the use of payroll deductions.12
 
   
If Measure 1487 does not pass, unions will be able to continue the practice of using automatic 
payroll deductions in order to make political contributions.  Corporations and government 
contractors will also be free to use automatic payroll deductions for political contributions.   
 
II. THE LAW 
 
a. Existing Law 
 
i. Definitions 
 
California law defines a contribution as a payment, a forgiveness of a loan, a payment of a loan 
by a third party, or an enforceable promise to make a payment.13  Specifically, that payment is 
made for purposes related to a political nominee’s candidacy for elective office if all or a portion 
of the payment is used for election-related activities.14
 
  
ii. Campaign Contributions Under California Law 
 
State laws place certain restrictions on the amount of money individuals, corporations, labor 
unions, and other organizations may contribute to a candidate’s campaign for political office or 
to a candidate-controlled committee. 
 
The California Fair Political Practices Commission (“FPPC”) administers the state’s campaign 
financing laws, imposes fines for violations of these laws, and defends these laws in court.  The 
FPPC sets forth all of their regulations in the California Code of Regulations (“CCR”).  
Specifically, contribution amounts by individuals are limited to $3,900 to candidates for the state 
legislature, $6,500 to candidates for state executive office other than the governor, and $26,000 
to the candidates for governor.15 The FPPC also regulates contributions given to state committees 
that contribute to state candidates.  Individuals may donate $6,500 to non-political party 
committees, $32,500 to political parties, and $200 to small contributor committees.16
 
  
 
 
iii. Campaign Contributions Under Federal Law 
 
Organizations and individuals have a constitutional right to contribute money to political 
campaigns, which is a right protected under freedom of speech.17
                                                 
12 FAQ, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE (Sept. 7, 2011), 
http://www.csueu.org/Home/Article/tabid/936/ItemId/723/View/Details/AMID/1977/Default.aspx 
  Contribution limits for federal 
elections are enforced by the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”).  The FEC set forth all its 
13 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82015(a) (West 2010).  
14 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82015(2)(C) (West 2010). 
15 2 C.C.R. § 18545 (2012). 
16 2 C.C.R. § 18534 (2012). 
17 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
regulations in Title 11 of the Code of Federal Regulations.  Individual contributions are limited 
to $2,500 per candidate per federal election.18
 
 
The FEC also regulates the amount individuals may give to committees that financially 
contribute to candidates.  Individuals are limited to: $30,800 to national party committees per 
year; $10,000 combined to state, local, and district party committees per year; and $5,000 to any 
other political committee per year.19  In total, no individual may give more than $46,200 to 
candidates and $70,800 to committees and PACs every two years.20  This represents a $117,000 
overall biennial limit.21  The biennial limit runs for a two-year period beginning January 1 of the 
odd-numbered year to December 31 of the next even-numbered year.22
 
  
iv. Use of Union Dues 
 
California has the largest number of union members in the country at 2.4 million people.23  In 
2011, 17.1% of all employed California residents were members of a union.24  Union dues are 
usually paid through the payroll deduction system, and these dues are typically used for 
collective bargaining activities.25  A portion of union members’ dues may be used to contribute to 
candidates and candidate-controlled committees as identified by union leaders.26
 
  
Public employee unions are free to set their own requirements of membership, including 
membership dues and fees.27  In the absence of an opt-out provision, members are required to 
pay the full amount of their dues and can only object to the use of union funds by resigning his or 
her union membership.28  After resigning membership in the union, the “agency fee objector” 
can officially object to the use of his or her dues for political purposes.29  According to the 
United States Department of Labor, employees who object to paying for non-representational 
activities such as political expenditures may be entitled to a refund as well as an appropriate 
reduction of future payments.30
 
 
Private sector unions are governed by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).  Private 
sector unions are allowed to collect membership dues through payroll deduction, provided that 
they receive written authorization from the employee.31
                                                 
18 11 C.F.R. § 110.1 (2010).   
  Thus, private sector unions can collect 
membership dues either automatically through payroll deduction, or through regular payment. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY (Jan. 27, 2012) . 
24 Id. 
25 Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights after Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012). 
26 11 C.F.R. § 114.5 (2012). 
27 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1152 (West 1982).   
28 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, The Use of Union Dues for Political Purposes: A Discussion of Agency Fee Objectors 
and Public Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH POLICY ARCHIVE, (June 1998) 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/413. 
29 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 28. 
30 Office of Labor-Management Standards, Fact Sheet: Executive Order 13201 – The Notice of Employee Rights 
Concerning Payment of Union Dues, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (June 15, 2005), 
http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/Beck_Fact_Sheet.htm. 
31 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(C)(4) (West 1995).  
 
v. Non-Union Members 
 
Non-union members pay union dues as a result of the “free-rider” problem, and payment of these 
dues is often a condition of employment.32  The “free-rider” problem refers to the concern that 
because non-union members will benefit from union negotiations, negotiations on behalf of all 
employees, those non-member need to pay union dues.33  Due to the free-rider problem, 
Congress has authorized compulsory unionism to the extent of funding collective bargaining, but 
not as a means to force employees to support political causes.34
 
 
The rights of public employee non-members are governed by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson.35  While non-members must still pay required fees, they 
have the right to control how their fees are used.  Specifically, non-members are allowed to 
object to fees that are used for any purpose unrelated to collective bargaining.36
 
  
Hudson set forth procedural requirements that a public-employee union must provide before a 
non-member’s fees can be used for a non-collective bargaining purpose.  First, there must be an 
adequate explanation of the basis for the fee.37  Second, non-members must be given a 
reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before a neutral decision-
maker.38  Third, the disputed fees must be placed in an escrow account while the challenge is 
pending.39  In addition to the Hudson requirements, California requires that public employee 
unions annually keep an adequate itemized record of its financial transactions.40
 
  
A similar standard is imposed on private sector unions.  The Supreme Court has established that 
non-members are not required to pay fees that are unrelated to collective bargaining activities.41
The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) currently requires a somewhat different 
procedural framework from Hudson that a public-employee union must provide before a non-
member’s fees can be used for a non-collective bargaining purpose.  First, a union employee 
must show that he or she has the right to be a non-member.
  
42  Second, as a non-member, the 
person must show that he or she has the right to object to payments not germane to collective 
bargaining activities.43 Third, the union must provide enough information for the employee to 
make an intelligent and informed decision.44
                                                 
32 Sachs, supra note 25. 
  Fourth, the union must inform the employee of its 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) (holding that non-members 
have a constitutional right to object to a compulsory funding of a union’s ideological activity). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986). 
40 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3546.5 (West 1977).   
41 Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (holding that requiring non-members to pay fees as a 
condition of employment does not include the right to charge fees that are not reasonably germane to collective 
bargaining activities). 
42 How do I cut off the use of my dues for politics and other nonbargaining activities?, NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK 
LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC. (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.nrtw.org/a/a_4_p.htm. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
procedure for filing objections.45  Fifth, the union must provide the percentage of the reduction 
and the basis for the calculation, with the opportunity to challenge their calculations.46
 
  
vi. Corporation Payroll Deductions 
 
It is unlawful for an employer to collect wages that are to be paid to an employee.47  Employers 
are allowed, however, to make deductions in certain circumstances.  First, an employer is 
required to deduct when empowered by state or federal law, such as for income tax or wage 
garnishments for court judgments.48  Second, an employer is allowed to make deductions when 
expressly authorized by the employee in writing, in order to cover insurance premiums, health 
benefits, or other deductions that do not amount to a rebate or deduction of the standard wage.49  
Third, employers are allowed to deduct in order to cover health, welfare, or pension plans that 
are expressly authorized by collective bargaining agreements.50
 
  Thus, in order to deduct wages 
for political purposes, an employer would have to receive express written consent from its 
employee. 
 
b. Proposed Changes to the Law 
 
i. In General 
 
The proposed changes to the law would still permit voluntary contributions to a union’s PAC, but 
only if the union employee provides annual written consent to the union and the funds are not 
taken by automatic payroll deduction.51
 
 
ii. Contributions 
 
Currently, corporations and unions are treated as individuals for purposes of political 
contribution limits.  Measure 1487 would create a new prohibition on corporations and unions by 
disallowing them from making any contributions to candidates or candidate-controlled 
committees.52  The proposed language of Measure 1487 states that all terms used in the 
proposal’s language that are defined by the Political Reform Act of 1974 or by regulation enacted 
by the Fair Political Practices Commission have the same meanings.53  “Contribution” is defined 
in the California Government Code § 84308(a)(6), an outgrowth of the Political Reform Act, as 
including “contributions to candidates and committees in federal, state, or local elections.”54  
Due to the inclusive language of Measure 1487, the prohibition would extend to political 
contributions made to both state and federal candidates.55
                                                 
45 Id. 
  In addition, government contractors 
46 Id. 
47 West's Ann. CAL. LABOR CODE § 224 (West 2012). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Rep. SEIU California State Council, supra note 12. 
52 Proposed Statewide Ballot Measure from Ashlee Titus to Krystal M. Paris, supra note 1. 
53 Id. 
54 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84308 (West 2012). 
55 Proposed Statewide Ballot Measure from Ashlee Titus to Krystal M. Paris, supra note 1. 
would be prohibited from making candidate contributions if that candidate, when elected, could 
play a role in awarding them a government contract.56
 
 
iii. Payroll Deductions 
 
Unions are allowed to make payroll deductions from members for political purposes, while non-
members have a federal right to object to political purpose deductions.  Measure 1487 would 
prohibit unions from making any payroll deductions that would go towards political purposes.57  
Instead, such deductions would be made strictly on a voluntary basis and unions would need to 
acquire yearly written consent.58
 
 
Conversely, Measure 1487 would have little effect on corporate payroll deductions.  Currently, 
corporations already need express written consent from employees if they wish to make payroll 
deductions that are not authorized by state or federal law, or collective bargaining agreements.59  
Measure 1487 would create an additional requirement that written consent from corporate 
employees to be given on an annual basis for payroll deductions.60
 
 
iv. Change of the burden of proof 
 
The statutory language of Measure 1487 states, “this measure shall be liberally construed to 
further its purposes.  In any legal action brought by an employee or union member to enforce the 
provisions of this Act, the burden shall be on the employer or labor union to prove compliance 
with the provisions herein.”61
 
 
III. HISTORY 
 
a. Proposition 226 (1998) 
 
Proposition 226 was an initiative on the June 1998 ballot.  If passed, Proposition 226 would have 
established new requirements with regards to payroll deductions for political activities.  The 
language of Proposition 226 was very much in line with that of Measure 1487.  If passed, it 
would have required all employers and labor organizations to annually obtain an employee’s or 
member’s permission before withholding wages or using union dues or fees for political 
contributions.62
 
   
In addition, Proposition 226 would have established a provision similar to federal law prohibiting 
campaign contributions from a foreign national for a candidate for public office.63  This 
restriction would have provided that residents, governments or entities of foreign countries could 
not contribute to political candidates for state or local office.64
                                                 
56 Id. 
 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 West's Ann. CAL. LABOR CODE § 224 (West 2012). 
60 Proposed Statewide Ballot Measure from Ashlee Titus to Krystal M. Paris, supra note 1. 
61 Id. 
62 Proposition 226: Political Contributions by Employees, Union Members, Foreign Entities,  SMART VOTER, 
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS (June 17, 1998), http://www.smartvoter.org/1998jun/ca/state/prop/226. 
63 Political Contributions by Employees, Union Members, Foreign Entities. Initiative Statute, LEGISLATIVE 
ANALYST’S OFFICE (June 1998), http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/1998/226_06_1998.htm. 
64 Proposition 226: Political Contributions by Employees, supra note 62. 
 
Proposition 226 was defeated in the June 1998 primary with 46.5% of voting Californians in 
support of the initiative and 53.5% of voting Californians against it.65
 
 
b. Proposition 75 (2005) 
 
Proposition 75 was a measure put forth on the November 2005 ballot.  If passed, Proposition 75 
would have prohibited the use by public employee labor organizations of dues or fees for 
political contributions without with the prior consent of individual public employees each year 
on a specified written form.66  This version of the measure also would have required unions to 
keep track of member political contributions and, if requested, report this information to the 
FPPC.67
 
 
The restriction would not have applied to dues or fees collected for charitable organizations, 
health care insurance, or other purposes directly benefiting the public employee.68
 
 
Proposition 75 was defeated on the November 2005 ballot with 46.5% of voting Californians in 
support of the initiative and 53.5% of voting Californians against it.69
 
 
In 2005, opponents of Proposition 75 outspent proponents 10-to-1, “with the California Teachers 
Association alone kicking in $12 million, and the California State Council of Service Employees 
adding $10 million. The biggest contributor in support of the 2005 initiative was the California 
Republican Party, which spent $1.2 million, followed by the California Chamber of Commerce, 
which added $500,000.”70
 
 
IV. LIKELY EFFECTS OF PROPOSED CHANGES 
 
a. Fiscal effect 
 
The Legislative Analysts Office (“LAO”) estimates that if Measure 1487 were implemented, it 
would likely increase the workload and costs of the FPPC.71  The FPPC would have to increase 
its budget in order to enforce and implement the new campaign finance requirements.72  While 
the LAO cannot predict an exact figure, it estimates that the cost could be in the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.73  The LAO does note, however, that some costs could be offset by 
additional revenue that the FPPC would receive for fines due to noncompliance with the new 
requirements.74
                                                 
65 Id. 
   
66 , Ira G. Clary & Nathan Barankin. Proposition 75: Public Employee Union Dues. Restrictions on Political 
Contributions., CAL. INIT. REV., (Fall 2005). 
67 Proposition 75: Public Employee Union Dues.  Restrictions on Political Contributions.  Employee Consent 
Requirement, SMART VOTER, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS (Jan. 28, 2006),  
http://www.smartvoter.org/2005/11/08/ca/state/prop/75/. 
68 Clary & Barankin, supra note 66. 
69 Proposition 75: Public Employee Union Dues, supra note 67. 
70 Steve Malanga, New bid to limit union political donations in California, PUBLIC SECTOR, INC. (June 9, 2011), 
http://www.publicsectorinc.com/forum/2011/06/new-bid-to-limit-union-political-donations-in-california.html. 
71 Stop Special Interest Money Now Act, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE (Jan. 28, 2012),  
http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2011/110309.aspx. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
 
 
 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
 
a. Preemption 
 
Preemption is a doctrine derived from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.75  
Under the doctrine of preemption, federal law preempts state law when the two are in conflict.  
Preemption can be either express or implied.  Express preemption occurs when a federal statute 
directly confirms the intent of Congress to preempt state law.76  Implied preemption can occur in 
two ways, conflict or field preemption.77  Conflict preemption applies if the state and federal 
statute are in direct conflict with one another, and thus it is impossible to follow both laws 
without violating one of them.78  Field preemption is warranted if a court finds that the federal 
government “occupies the field” in the relevant area of law, and thus did not intend for the states 
to supplement it.79
 
 
The decision in Buckley v. Valeo “is authority for state limits on campaign contributions.”80  
According to this United States Supreme Court decision, states can enact statutes that create 
different contributions limits than provided for by federal campaign laws.  Specifically, Buckley 
held that comparable state limits on contributions to state political candidates are constitutional, 
“and those limits need not be pegged to the precise dollar amounts approved in Buckley.”81
 
  
Thus, the Court’s decision in Buckley is direct authority for states’ abilities to make laws 
regarding campaign contribution limits. 
In Davenport v. Washington Education Association, the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly 
emphasized that “states have broad discretion to tailor the benefit of allowing the union to take 
money from the paychecks of workers to support union activities so long as they do so in a 
manner that is above the “constitutional floor” established by cases like Beck, Hudson, and 
Abood.”82   In Davenport, the United States Supreme Court expressly gave states the latitude to 
make laws concerning union paycheck deductions.83  Because of this express decision, states are 
free to enact paycheck deduction statutes as long as they do not contradict federal law regarding 
permissive amounts of payroll deductions.84
 
 
b. Freedom of Speech 
 
                                                 
75 U.S. CONST. art. VI.  (The "Constitution and the laws of the United States...shall be the supreme law of the 
land...anything in the constitutions or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding"). 
76 English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990). 
77 Massachusetts Ass'n of HMOs v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1999). 
78 Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
79 Id. 
80 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
81 Id. 
82 BRIEF FOR PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, 
MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION ET AL. AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS, 
Knox v. SEIU, 2011 WL 4352228 (U.S.) (Appellate Brief) Supreme Court of the United States. 
83 Davenport v. Washington Education Association, 127 U.S. 2372 (2007). 
84 Id. 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law…abridging freedom of speech.”85  
First, it is significant that both corporations and unions could bring First Amendment claims due 
to the decision in Citizens United.  The First Amendment has been interpreted to have been 
written in terms of speech, not speakers, so there is no basis for excluding certain categories of 
speakers.86
 
 
The First Amendment claim could be related to the ban on candidate contributions.  Limits on 
contributions to candidate campaigns have yet to be held unconstitutional.87
 
  
Bans on contributions to candidate campaigns, however, are another matter.  The California 
Supreme Court has previously held that a ban on lobbyist contributions to candidates was 
unconstitutional.88  While the Court’s decision dealt with the rights of lobbyists, that right could 
be extended to corporations and unions as a result of Citizens United.  An interest in anti-
corruption is valid, but limitations on contributions already further that interest.89  Individuals 
have the freedom to symbolically associate with candidates through political contributions, and 
that right could logically include corporations and unions.90
 
 
State regulations imposing limits on the amount of money that PACs may contribute are subject 
to strict scrutiny.  This requires such regulations to be narrowly tailored to serve a sufficiently 
compelling state interest. 
 
Political contributions are a form of political free speech, as they represent a contributor’s ability 
to freely associate with a political candidate or party.  An express ban on political contributions 
would be a direct suppression of this political speech.  Measure 1487 may represent an anti-
corruption interest, but that interest is mitigated by campaign contribution limits already in place.  
Campaign contribution limits already ensure that political candidates do not receive large 
donations from a relatively small number of donors.  Moreover, the Buckley court noted, 
“contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations 
prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for 
effective advocacy.”91
 
  An express ban would seriously hamper political candidates’ abilities to 
raise enough funds to effectively run their campaigns.  Thus, Measure 1487 could be interpreted 
as too broad and not serving an important state interest that would justify its restriction on First 
Amendment freedoms. 
c. Severability 
 
                                                 
85 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
86 Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
87 Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S.Ct. 612 (1976) (holding that a limitation on contributions involves little 
direct restraint on political communication because it permits the symbolic expression of support 
while not infringing on the contributor’s ability to discuss candidates and issues).   
88 Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Super. Ct., 25 Cal.3d 33, 53 (1979) (holding that a ban infringed on a 
lobbyists’ freedom of association and a ban on all contributions was not narrowly directed to aspects of political 
association where political corruption could be identified). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S.Ct. 612 (1976). 
If a court finds a part of the initiative to be invalid or unconstitutional, it will apply the three-part 
Gerken test.92  For an initiative to survive the Gerken test, the remaining parts of the measure 
must: make grammatical sense; be complete and functional in and of itself; and be something the 
electorate considered separately and would have adopted without the invalid provisions.93  The 
third part of the Gerken test is a consideration of whether the electorate would have voted for the 
initiative if it were presented in its severed form.94
 
   
Measure 1487 covers two main prohibitions: a prohibition on corporations, unions, and 
government contractors from making direct contributions to political candidates; and a 
prohibition on corporations and unions from using payroll deductions for political purposes 
without voluntary written consent.  While Measure 1487 is titled the “Stop Special Interest 
Money Now Act,” its supporters also know it as the “Paycheck Protection Act”.  The act is 
recognized as both stopping the contributions to candidates, as well as giving greater control to 
employees and union members over what may be deducted from their paychecks.  Thus, it seems 
very likely that the electorate would vote for both provisions if they were presented as separate 
initiatives. 
 
Measure 1487 burdens both unions and corporations in participating in political campaigns.  If 
1487 passes, it is likely to be challenged on First Amendment grounds as a violation of free 
speech. 
 
In Citizens United, the non-profit corporation Citizens United brought an action against the 
Federal Elections Commission regarding whether it was allowed to air a documentary critical of 
then-presidential candidate Hilary Clinton.95  Citizens United brought the suit because it was 
afraid it would be violating 2 U.S.C. § 441b, which prohibited corporations and unions from 
using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that expressly 
advocated the election or defeat of a candidate.96
 
 
The Supreme Court held that 2 U.S.C. § 441b was unconstitutional.97  The Court evaluated the 
law under strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove that the restriction it created 
furthers a compelling interest, and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest.98  The Court reasoned that laws enacted to regulate or control speech can operate at 
different points in the speech process.99  Thus, a restriction on the amount of money a person or 
group can spend on political communications about a campaign reduces the quality of expression 
because it reduces the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of 
the audience reached.100  The corporate expenditures at issue in the case did not interfere with 
any government functions, but did interfere with voters’ ability to obtain information from 
diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their votes.101
 
  Therefore, 2 U.S.C. § 441b 
violated the First Amendment. 
                                                 
92 Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 6 Cal.4th 707 (1993). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
Concurrently, the Supreme Court recognized that First Amendment rights extend to corporations 
and unions.  Specifically, corporations could be considered individuals because political speech 
did not lose protection simply because its source was a corporation.102  Like individuals, 
corporations fund their speech from money obtained through the economic market.103  Moreover, 
there is no real difference between regular corporations and media corporations, so restrictions 
similar to 2 U.S.C. § 441b would allow the government to suppress political speech through 
media outlets.104
 
  
It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court’s opinion dealt primarily with 
electioneering communications.  It did not deal with direct candidate contributions limits, which 
have been held as a constitutional means to prevent quid pro quo corruption.105
 
   
Measure 1487’s second section seems to be a more explicit violation of the Citizens United 
decision.  An express ban on using payroll deductions for political purposes violates a 
corporation’s right to make independent expenditures, as political speech cannot be suppressed 
on the basis of corporate identity.106  In addition, unions fund their general treasury funds with 
payroll deductions.  A ban on the use of their funds is a violation of First Amendment political 
speech rights.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has found that there is no overriding anti-corruption 
interest in regulating independent expenditures because there is a difference between speaking on 
issues of general public interest and incurring political debts from legislators.107
 
  By banning 
payroll deductions from being used for any political purposes, Measure 1487 infringes on a 
union’s right to engage in political speech. 
Conversely, it could be argued that the issue is not about a corporation or union’s right to engage 
in political speech, but rather the money they use to fund that political speech.  Thus, proponents 
of Measure 1487 could argue that corporations and unions are imposing their own political 
speech on their employees and members.  In regards to payroll deductions, the Supreme Court 
has previously held in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association that an Idaho law that banned 
public state employee unions from using payroll deductions for political purposes was 
constitutional.108
 
  Ysursa was decided, however, before the Citizens United decision.  Thus, 
Ysursa could conflict with a union’s ability to make political expenditures in accordance with 
their First Amendment right.   
More importantly, Ysursa created a critical distinction between private corporations and public 
employee unions.  The Supreme Court declined to extend strict scrutiny to the Idaho unions 
because of the relationship between government and private corporations, versus the relationship 
between government and subordinate units of the government.109
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that a private corporation is subject to regulation, but a subordinate unit carries out delegated 
government functions and is subject to direct oversight.110
 
   
While both corporations and public unions are subject to the government’s authority, only 
corporations have privileges and immunities that can be invoked in opposition to government 
regulation.111
 
  As a subordinate unit, a public employee union is subject to the government’s will.  
Therefore, the constitutionality of payroll deductions may differ depending on who brings a First 
Amendment suit.  It would seem that private corporations and private unions would have a much 
stronger claim under a strict scrutiny review, while public employee unions have fewer rights 
because of their subordinate relationship with the government. 
One thing that Ysursa and Citizens United do not address, however, is an important fundamental 
difference that exists between corporations and unions.  A union’s general treasury consists of 
union dues paid by members.  Federal law regulates the use of union dues by prohibiting unions 
from using an employee’s dues for political purposes if that employee objects.112  Conversely, 
corporations derive their general treasury funds from profits generated from shareholder 
investments.113  Unlike unions, corporations are free to use their general funds however they may 
choose and shareholders cannot opt out.114  Thus, while campaign finance law aims to treat 
corporations and unions evenhandedly, it results in an unbalanced treatment.  This imbalance is 
created because Ysursa and Citizens United only addressed the ability to spend on political 
expenditures, not the ability to fund that spending.  The law does not require that unions and 
corporations have access to a similar amount of funds for political expenditures.  The law does, 
however, give corporations a legal advantage over unions because corporations can spend their 
general treasuries on politics even if individual shareholders object, while unions cannot do so.  
In a corporate setting, individual shareholders cannot opt out of financing political spending, 
while union members remain free to opt out.115
 
 
In addition, the Supreme Court is currently deciding a case that implicates a union’s ability to 
make payroll deductions for political purposes from non-consenting non-members.  In Knox v. 
SEIU, the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) made a special assessment in 2005 
in order to combat Proposition 75, which was aimed at restricting the use of union funds for 
political purposes.116  While SEIU sent out the required legal notice to non-members explaining 
how the fees were calculated and would be used, it did not comport with legal notice 
requirements.117  Non-union employees successfully brought a claim in District Court that their 
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.118  The Ninth Circuit reversed in 
part, however, and the non-union employees subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, where 
the outcome is still pending.119
 
 
                                                 
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
112 Sachs, supra note 25. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Sachs, supra note 25. 
116 Michael P. Tremoglie, Supreme Court to Hear Union Dues Case Tuesday, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Feb. 17, 2012), 
http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/234837-supreme-court-to-hear-union-dues-case-Tuesday. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
An argument can be made that Knox is moot because the non-union employees have already 
received their award from the district court and did not appeal from the district court ruling.120  
Moreover, SEIU has implemented new notice requirements that satisfied the employees’ 
concerns.121
 
  The Supreme Court could still make a decision, however, based on the merits of the 
claim.  Specifically, the question for the Court to decide would turn on whether state employees 
have the First Amendment right to decline to pay union dues used for political advocacy for the 
union.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision in Knox will have a direct impact on the 
eventual failure or success of Measure 1487.   
VI. DRAFTING ISSUES 
 
a. Severability Clause 
 
Measure 1487 contains a severability clause that allows clauses of the initiative to be removed if 
they are found to be invalid.  Specifically, it states that if any part is found to be invalid or 
unconstitutional, then, “…the remaining provisions, parts, and applications shall remain in effect 
without the invalid provision, part, or application.”122
 
  Although the initiative has a severability 
clause, it is not determinative. 
If a court finds a part of the initiative to be invalid or unconstitutional, it will apply the three-part 
Gerken test (outlined above on page 13).  For an initiative to survive the Gerken test, the 
remaining parts of the measure must: make grammatical sense; be complete and functional in 
and of itself; and be something the electorate considered separately and would have adopted 
without the invalid provisions.123
 
 
While Measure 1487 is clearly drafted, it does contain several provisions that could be held 
unconstitutional.  Both its prohibition of direct contributions to political candidates and its 
prohibition on the use of payroll deductions could come under strict scrutiny by the Court.  If 
both parts of Measure 1487 were to be held unconstitutional, then the proposed initiative would 
not likely survive because both provisions are the substantive part of the petition.   
 
Measure 1487 would likely survive if only one of the provisions was held to be unconstitutional.  
A prohibition on direct contributions to political candidates does not implicate a prohibition on 
using payroll deductions for political purposes, and vice versa.  Thus, depending on whether both 
substantive provisions of the initiative are declared unconstitutional, Measure 1487 could survive 
the first two parts of the Gerken test. 
 
VII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
a. Proponents’ Main Arguments 
 
i. Removal of Special Interests From Politics 
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Measure 1487 is a project of the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association.124  According to the 
official Measure 1487 website, the Stop Special Interest Money Now Act “removes Big Money 
Interests from politics so that public officials will pay more attention to the people who elected 
them.”125  Proponents also state in a video featured on the website that special interests dominate 
California, and the government is serving the “big special interests” instead of the people.126
 
   
Dan Walters, a political journalist for the Sacramento Bee, is quoted in the official website video 
as stating, “the Capitol’s chief activity is, in fact, directly or indirectly taking money from 
someone and giving it to someone else.  And one of its dirty little secrets is that the hundreds of 
millions of dollars spent on lobbying, contributions and other tools of persuasion pale in 
comparison to the many billions of dollars that politicians can dispense.”127
 
  Essentially, the main 
argument is that with the passing of Measure 1487, government officials and politicians would 
no longer be influenced by any breed of special interest money.   
The website video discusses how politicians in Sacramento do not have the best interests of 
California’s residents at heart.128  Instead, proponents of Measure 1487 argue that politicians in 
California are really working “for the special interests that bankroll their campaigns.”129  
Proponents state that Measure 1487 “attacks at every point where money changes hands between 
special interests and California’s politicians in three ways: (1) bans both corporate and labor 
union contributions to campaigns, (2) it stops government contractors from contributing to 
officials who can award them contracts, stopping pay-to-play, and (3) bars all employers and 
unions from taking money out of employees’ payroll checks for political purposes.”130
Proponents argue that California is broken.  Themes such as California’s high unemployment, 
failing schools, high taxation, billions in unfunded state employee pension debt, and the lack of 
politicians’ ability to balance the state budget are all cited as reasons why California needs 
Measure 1487.
  
131  U.S. Secretary of State and longtime California resident George Shultz argues, 
“the initiative, which would enact progressive reforms to California’s campaign finance system, 
seeks to end the toxic pay-for-play politics by which corporations and unions corrupt politicians 
in Sacramento and throughout California’s cities and counties.”132  By weakening the effect of 
special interest persuasion, legislators will have more time to focus on the job at hand and 
accomplish something productive for California and its residents.133  “The Stop Special Interest 
Money Now Act will fundamentally dilute the corrosive nature of this system by altering the 
relationship between politicians and their campaign contributors.”134
ii. Equal Effect on Unions and Corporations 
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Michael D. Capaldi, a Southern California-based attorney, asserts that Measure 1487 curtails the 
actions of both unions and corporations, contrary to the claim of unions that they would be the 
ones disproportionately affected in a negative manner by this measure.  Capaldi claims, “We can 
do both -- deal a blow to corporate and union power together. That's Stop Special Interest Money 
Now. It's tough on both sides, but it's good for California.”135
 
 
In fact, corporations are asserted to feel more of a negative consequence from the measure than 
unions.  Capaldi states, “when you do the math, it turns out the contribution ban hurts 
corporations far more than unions… not only will unions be fine because corporations will be 
no-shows, labor will dominate direct political contributions.”136
 
 
iii.   Protects Free Expression without Coercion 
 
A central argument in support of Measure 1487 is that it would protect the right of union 
members and corporate employees to express their views and contribute to campaigns as they 
saw fit, if at all; and it is unquestionably unfair and coercive to force employees to contribute to 
these political causes automatically.137
 
  Most of all, proponents say that union political 
fundraising will not be affected because unions can still collect political contributions on an 
automatic basis.   
The only difference is that with Measure 1487, labor unions and corporations cannot freely reach 
their powerful hands into an employee’s paycheck coffer in order to further union or 
corporation’s own political agenda.  “First, unions will be free to ask their members to 
contribute. In fact, unions will be entitled to collect political contributions automatically, directly 
from any member's bank account or credit card, if they receive the member's permission. Every 
union will be able to raise political money, and the unions that promote causes their members 
actually support will raise more.”138  This ensures that employees are contributing to causes that 
they actually believe in, and are not simply being coerced into contributing blindly to a cause 
they may not agree with.  After all, workers have “a constitutional right to be free from 
compelled speech”, and this right should be vigorously protected.139
 
 
iv. Aligns State Law with Federal Law 
 
Some proponents make the argument that the introduction and passage of Measure 1487 would 
simply be aligning California state law with existing federal law by taking “the rulings the 
Supreme Court made in the cases of Communication Workers v. Beck and Chicago Teachers 
Union v. Hudson, and [giving] them the force of law in California.”  This was said by Lew Uhler, 
head of the National Tax Limitation Committee (“NTLC”), one of the driving forces behind the 
almost-successful 1998 initiative.140
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b. Opponents’ Main Arguments 
 
i. Payroll Deduction 
 
Opponents argue that Measure 1487 has the practical effect of only limiting unions and is a 
veiled attempt to restrict organized labor’s sources of funding.  Through the payroll deduction 
system, unions are able to obtain funds from their members that they might not otherwise be able 
to if they were required to obtain yearly written consent.141  Unions rely on member dues as the 
primary source for general funds, and Measure 1487 handcuffs their ability to pool money in 
order to make any sort of political impact akin to corporations.142  As an example of the disparity 
in spending, as of 2008 numbers, corporations outspent unions 19 to 1.143  The Center for 
Responsive Politics puts this number closer to 15 to 1, but regardless opponents point out that the 
disparity is substantial.144
 
 
Furthermore, opponents argue that corporations would have an easier time side-stepping 
Measure 1487’s limitations as opposed to unions.145  While corporations are restricted from 
using payroll deductions as a means to create funds for political contributions, corporations do 
not often use payroll deductions for that purpose.146  Instead, corporations often dip into their 
profits for political contribution funds.147  Measure 1487 may limit political contributions that 
stem from payroll deductions, but it does not restrict political contributions from other sources of 
funds.  Corporations could turn to corporate rents, investment income, organizational dues from 
other corporations, and any other source of non-employee based revenues.148
 
  Thus, corporations 
would continue to make unlimited contributions from their profits without the need for consent 
from their employees. 
Additionally, opponents point out that almost identical measures have been proposed twice in the 
past, and have failed on both occasions.  The only difference between those past initiatives and 
Measure 1487 is the technical inclusion of corporations, presumably in order to appeal to a wider 
audience of Californians.  In fact, the informational video on the proponent’s official website is 
stated as being posted by “takebackca,” but interestingly has no relation whatsoever to the 
California Democratic activist group with a similar name, “Take Back Red California.”149
 
 
 
ii. Government Contractor Definition 
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Opponents also take issue with the government contractor provision.  While the provision seems 
to be applicable to both unions and corporations, opponents argue it is specifically directed at 
unions because government contracts are defined as including collective bargaining agreements 
between public agencies and labor unions.150
 
 
By definition, collective bargaining agreements address the terms and conditions of services 
provided to employers.  Unions in the state of California include public employee unions, the 
majority of which have collective bargaining agreements with administrative agencies.  On the 
other hand, private corporations do not often contract with public agencies.  Such private-public 
partnerships are rare and California has often reacted negatively to privatization, including recent 
efforts to privatize state water and parks.  Thus, opponents argue that the government contractors 
provision is aimed almost exclusively at unions. 
 
iii. Unaddressed PAC Problem 
 
Opponents also point out that Measure 1487 does not address the real source of political 
contributions: independently run political action committees.  Political action committees, or 
PACs, are independently run political committees that can represent business and labor interests, 
political candidates, and even ballot initiatives.151
 
  While Measure 1487 bans unions and 
corporations from making direct contributions to candidates, it does not ban contributions to 
PACs.     
Unions would still be hindered in their ability to donate to PACs because of Measure 1487’s 
payroll deduction ban.  If unions wanted to create political action committees, their PAC would 
have to be funded by members by means other than a payroll deduction system, with yearly 
written consent.152
 
  Effectively, unions would have to rely on voluntary contributions from their 
members outside of the regular dues system.   
On the other hand, corporations could continue to make contributions to PACs if those 
contributions were derived from sources other than employee-based deductions.  In addition, 
PACs could use those funds to make direct contributions to candidates as long as donations were 
made from the individuals of the corporation and not from the corporation itself.  Thus, PACs 
would remain a viable way for corporations to funnel money for candidate contributions. 
 
Moreover, Measure 1487 does not address the growing super PAC problem.  Super PACs are 
independent expenditure-only committees that are unaffiliated with political parties and 
candidates.153
   
  Corporations and unions are allowed to make unlimited contributions to super 
PACs, who in turn spend money advocating the election or defeat of specific candidates.  Thus, a 
corporation could make unlimited contributions to super PACs, who in turn would independently 
campaign for candidates that the corporation supports. 
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In the current election cycle as of March 14, 2012, outside groups have spent $92,085, 861 on 
both state and federal elections.154  Organizations not affiliated with political parties have spent 
$88,284,926 of that amount, of which $77,481,361 was spent by super PACs.155
 
 
iv. Scope of Campaign Contributions 
 
Opponents also point out that corporations do not devote a lot of funds contributing to political 
candidates.  Typically, corporations focus their political expenditures on ballot measures, 
initiatives, and other independent campaigns.156
 
  This is significant because Measure 1487 
specifically focuses upon donations to political candidates.  Thus, Measure 1487 isn’t as nearly 
as effective as it purports to be because it only addresses one area of political contributions, 
which attracts a small percentage of corporate political expenditures. 
In particular, Altria, Chevron, and AT&T have spent around $19.4 million collectively in 
California politics in the last two years.157  Of that amount, $2.7 million went to candidates or 
incumbents.158  The other $16.7 million went towards ballot measures, initiatives, and political 
parties.159
 
 
Thus, opponents point out that corporations could still find other ways to make political 
contributions.  Again, this goes back to the payroll deduction system.  Many unions receive 
membership dues through a payroll deduction system, so they would be unable to make 
contributions towards ballot measures and independent campaigns.  On the other hand, 
corporations do not rely as heavily on employee funds for political contributions and would still 
be able to fund political expenditures.   
 
According to Thad Kousser, a political science professor at UC San Diego, unions need to devote 
a substantial amount of resources towards blocking this bill, or else “they could become almost 
extinct in California politics.”160
 
  Additionally, opponent Ron Lind, President of the United Food 
and Commercial Workers Local 5, stated: 
[T]he measure is a wolf in sheep's clothing designed to fool voters 
into approving a corporate power grab that will lead to even more 
corporate influence over our political system. What the backers 
won't say publicly is that they've written a giant loophole to allow 
for unlimited corporate spending on campaigns while furthering 
their real agenda of silencing the voices of middle-class workers 
and their unions.161
 
 
                                                 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Dan Morain, Reform' Initiative Wears a Soiled White Hat, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 29 
2012), http://www.sacbee.com/2011/12/22/4139050/dan-morain-reform-initiative-
wears.html#storylink=cpy. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Harmon, Steven.  High-Stakes Labor Battle Coming to California.  SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (29 January 2012), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_19848968. 
161 Lind, supra note 144. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
Measure 1487 represents the public’s growing mistrust of special interest influence on 
government.  If passed, Measure 1487 would create two new prohibitions on corporations and 
unions.  First, corporations and unions would no longer be permitted to make direct political 
contributions to candidates for office or to candidate-controlled committees.  Second, 
corporations and unions would no longer be able to use payroll deductions as a source of funding 
for political purposes. 
Proponents argue that limiting the sphere of influence that special interests have on politics is 
always a good thing.  Thus, there is a strong anti-corruption interest because a prohibition on 
contributions limits the leverage that special interests create and politicians no longer feel the 
need to reward their donors.  Moreover, proponents argue that Measure 1487 helps protect the 
political rights of union members and employees.  Instead of handing over money to their unions 
or employers, they are free to donate as they choose.  As Gary Schultz notes, “it minimizes the 
influence of the well-funded few and empowers the nearly-silenced many.”162
Opponents, on the other hand, point out that Measure 1487 is not as even-handed as it seems.  
Specifically, Measure 1487 attacks unions more so than it does corporations.  Opponents point 
out that corporations do not rely on payroll deductions for political purposes, and often donate to 
political causes from their profits, investments, or other sources of independent revenue.  
Moreover, unions do not have access to other funds and rely solely on membership dues for their 
general treasury funds.  “That's why the nonpartisan consumer advocacy group Public Citizen 
recently opposed the measure, saying it ‘is little more than an attack on labor masquerading as 
campaign finance reform.’”
 
163  The direct result of Measure 1487 would be that of “depriving 
Democratic political candidates of a major source of campaign cash.”164  Opponents argue that 
since unions represent the interests of all workers, not just those of union members, it is 
imperative that they continue to have a voice in politics—and this voice will be drowned out if 
Measure 1487 is passed.165
 
 
Even if Measure 1487 is approved, it implicates several First Amendment issues. Citizens 
United, a Supreme Court case,
 
 gave corporations and unions the right to make independent 
political expenditures because it was deemed a form of political free speech.  More importantly, 
the Supreme Court is currently deciding Knox v. SEIU, which could directly affect whether 
unions are allowed to make payroll deductions for political purposes.   
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